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1
Introduction
Change is difficult. Civilizations have crumbled and the hopes and dreams of nations
have been dashed on the rock of this seemingly incontrovertible truth. The modern Middle East
reflects this truth. Despite (or perhaps because of) herculean U.S. investment, the region
continues to crush and frustrate U.S. policy objectives in contemporary warfare. Even with the
recent rise of Russia and China as the United States’ primary nation state competitors, the
Middle East remains vitally important. Great Power competition from Russia and China has only
added new layers of threats to a region already featuring dangerous (albeit non-existential)
threats to the United States from terrorism, war, and instability. In the midst of the regional
instability, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia maintain a fierce
rivalry vying for regional hegemony. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia appears to view Iran as an
existential threat and therefore willing to take a greater range of actions to deter and disrupt Iran
while creating advantages in the rivalry. The rivalry plays out across many critical dimensions
of power and influence including religious, economic, and even direct military confrontations.
Adding to the complexity, one state (Iran) remains one of the most overtly hostile actors towards
U.S. policy while the other (Saudi Arabia) is a strong regional ally. The stakes of the Iran and
Saudi Arabia rivalry for regional hegemony, which would allow the victor to control the bulk of
the global energy flow and militarily encroach on key US regional allies, compel and incentivize
U.S. action to at least monitor- if not actively influence- the regional competition.
Because both Iran and Saudi Arabia are not fully compatible (as partners or potential
partners) with the United States in terms of their orientation towards Western political and
economic values (namely liberal-democratic and free-market principles), U.S. efforts to support
and influence the rivalry should start with identifying and encouraging reform efforts within each
country that seek to better align political and economic structures with U.S. and Western values.
The purpose of this article is to identify the change agents in both Iran and Saudi Arabia working
to bring Western political and economic values to each country and establish the contributing
factors behind these reform initiatives (the “who” and the “why” regarding change). Next, the
article will analyze the dynamics that fuel the reform initiatives in each country with an eye
towards offering recommendations for U.S. policy and actions in the region (the “how” and
“what next” of change). A fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy asserts that U.S. interests are
best served in a stable international community. Likewise, a biblical worldview demands that, to
the best extent possible, people (and nations) live peaceably amongst themselves.1 This implies
an imperative to work towards peace and exhaust options before resorting to warfare. Smart
policy and actions that effectively support, incentivize, and nurture reform initiatives to
favorably resolve the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry in the Middle East represent the best chance for
all parties to realize the great benefits of peace and stability in the much-maligned region.
Part I: History, Religion, and Change
For all their apparent differences, Iran and Saudi Arabia are remarkably similar (from a
U.S. perspective) in one important area: they both desire regional hegemony in the Middle East.
Their commitment to this shared goal is accompanied by a second, somewhat paradoxical,
dynamic: the rivals often (as will be shown) either employ, or are influenced by, opposite
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approaches and factors in their efforts to achieve hegemony.2 There are many superficial (or at
least superficially treated) differences that mark the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry that are often
mentioned and frequently used to definitively (though perhaps not accurately) explain the
differences and animosity between the two rivals. Foremost among these differences is that fact
that Iran is a predominantly Shia Muslim country while Saudi Arabia is Sunni Muslim.
Additionally, Iranians are Persians while Saudis are Arabs. These differences no doubt contribute
to the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and give it a (not-insignificant) religious and cultural dimension.
However, there is much more to these differences, which apply only at the broadest levels, that
transcend simple, neat, and tidy religious and cultural distinctions. Going beyond the surfacelevel differences tied to Iran and Saudi Arabia’s differing religious and historical cultural
heritage is critical to accurately evaluating and interpreting Western-style reform efforts in play
in each country.
Perhaps the obvious starting point for discussing the critical cultural and religious factors
that impact current reform efforts in each country lies with a brief sketch of Iranian and Saudi
history. People groups identifying themselves as “Iranians” or “Persians” have existed in roughly
the same geographic location (modern day Iran) in varying conditions of political sovereignty for
thousands of years. Even as Iran’s fortunes have ebbed and flowed with the currents of history,
based on their own power and stability relative to conquering invaders, a distinctly “Iranian”
identity can be traced back through this long historical lineage that still resonates with and
impacts modern Iranians.3 Along with an enduring national identity, Iran’s history gives it
extensive experience developing, building (and re-building) economies and complex societies.
By contrast, the history of the modern state of Saudi Arabia begins in 1932 – after Abdul Aziz
Ibn Saud unified the Nejd and Hijaz regions of the Arabian Peninsula to form the modern
Kingdom.4 To be sure, this is not to suggest that no history existed in the Arabian Peninsula prior
to Ibn Saud’s conquests (the peninsula founded a major religion and evidence of human
existence dates back thousands of years). Additionally, Abdul Azziz’s Kingdom represents the
third such attempt- since the 18th century at forming a Saudi-family ruled kingdom on the
Arabian Peninsula.5 However, unlike Iran, the history of a unified political and geographic
entity with a distinctly Saudi identity is less than a century old. Using the metric of time, the
Saudi state can be described as nascent (when compared with Iran) with considerably less
experience building and developing the institutions of the modern state and (likely) a different
set of societal expectations from government structures.
Besides being on opposite sides of the historical spectrum, the current expressions of the
modern state in both Saudi Arabia and Iran relied on religion in their establishment – though in
opposite fashions. In unifying the Hijaz and Nejd regions of the Arabian Peninsula to form the
boundaries of the Kingdom, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud relied on armies of religious holy warriors,
known as the “ikhwan,” to fight and defeat his tribal enemies.6 These warriors, remnants of the
ultra-conservative religious sect that formed the ideological basis of previous Saudi kingdoms,
2

Kim Ghattas. 2020. Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled
Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East. Henry Holt and Company.
3
Michael Axworthy. 2016. A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus
Books Group.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat04401a&AN=jsou.ocn951551474&site=eds-live.
4
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5
Lacey, The Kingdom, ch 1-2
6
Lacey, The Kingdom, 142.

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol1/iss1/4

2

Harr: A Guarding of the Change

3
fought (and won) many of the critical battles over competing tribes and territorial rivals on the
Arabian peninsula for Abdul Aziz.7 Abdul Aziz could not have unified and created the modern
Saudi state without the ikhwan. However, after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with
their radical religious tilt- became too extreme in their beliefs and desire to influence the
burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in 1929 to Saudi state without the ikhwan.
However, after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became
too extreme in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul
Aziz in 1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at
the ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh. The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Saudi state without the ikhwan. However,
after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became too extreme
in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in
1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the
ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh. The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Saudi state without the ikhwan. However,
after establishing the Kingdom, the ikhwan – with their radical religious tilt- became too extreme
in their beliefs and desire to influence the burgeoning Saudi state. This forced Abdul Aziz in
1929 to first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the
ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh. The defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings
latitude from the religious establishment to merge modernization efforts with religious traditions
in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created
by the cushion between religion and politics proved critically important (and lucrative) after the
discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the formation of the still-enduring “special
relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. first marginalize and then, ultimately, destroy
the ikhwan a bloody final battle at the ikhwan’s desert stronghold south west of Riyadh.8 The
defeat of the ikhwan gave Saudi kings latitude from the religious establishment to merge
modernization efforts with religious traditions in a (mostly) supportive relationship. The space to
engage foreign, non-Muslim entities created by the cushion between religion and politics proved
critically important (and lucrative) after the discovery of oil in the Kingdom- which enabled the
formation of the still-enduring “special relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.9
In post-1979 Iran, the opposite played out. Capitalizing on mass protests against a
decadent, corrupt, and repressive government, Shia religious hardliners hijacked the movement
and installed the current revolutionary regime. The so-called “Islamic Revolution” in Iran was
not wholly (or even predominantly) religious. Indeed, many groups (such as the Kurds, liberal
minded intelligentsia, and leftists) who initially supported Ayatollah Khomeini upon his return to
7
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Tehran in 1979 found themselves the targets of his repression as he consolidated his gains in the
aftermath of the uprising.10 As reported by Misagh Parsa, such efforts led to the arrest and
slaughtering of estimated thousands of dissenters- including some in Khomeini’s immediate and
higher political circle- over the course of the regime’s rise to power after 1979.11 According to
Parsa’s account, few in Iran were expecting (or desiring) the religious clerical takeover that
Khomeini implemented as part of his “religious guardianship” (vilayat-e-faqih”) theocraic
system of governement.12 The history of violent repression and suppression of all political and
religious opposition continued through the generations that followed the revolution and today,
many have declared the revolution “dead” while estimating that 85% of the population do not
support the hardline religious regime.13 The adoption of Khomeini’s hardline religious regime
vilayat-e-faqih both directly (through its revolutionary policies) and indirectly (through the
consequences of those policies) isolated Iran from Western ideology and collaboration.14
King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud was a statesman who deftly co-opted tribal and religious
elements to establish the modern political boundaries and identity of Saudi Arabia. In contrast,
modern Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, infamously quipped that he was a “revolutionary, not
a diplomat.”15 In other words, he identified more as a religious zealot and not as a statesman.
While being careful not to oversimplify, the difference in leaders reflects a great deal about the
role of religion in the two states. Modern Western fear-mongers love to point to Saudi Arabia’s
historical alliance with so-called radical religious idealism to disparage the Kingdom as a
sponsor of terrorism – lumping them into the same category as Iran. However, the facts tell a
different story. In a very real sense, it can be said that Saudi Arabia used religion (the ikhwan
warriors) to establish a political entity (the modern Saudi state) while Iran, by influencing
protests for political change, used political entities(the diverse and popular political unrest
against the Shah in 1979) to establish a religion (Khomeini’s ‘vilayat-e-faqih’). In this narrow
sense, one can speculate that the revolutionary mechanisms and outwardly hostile disposition of
the Iranian government are what Saudi Arabia might have looked like if the ikhwan had
triumphed during the early years of the Kingdom and, conversely, the openness toward
engagement with the West that marks the Saudi government is what Iran might have looked like
if the political activists of the Iranian Revolution had not been totally subsumed by the radical
religious clerics.
As noted from the outset, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia align completely with U.S.
conceptions of an ideal regional ally. The misalignment is likely related to the extent to which
each rival has inculcated (or shown a willingness to inculcate) Western political and economic
values. Accordingly, U.S. efforts to support or influence the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry require the
identification and support of domestic initiatives to bring about desired changes in each country.
Here too, the domestic dynamics within Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken on antonymous
attributes. In Saudi Arabia, ruling elites represent the change agents advocating for Western
10
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reforms and push efforts to integrate Western values (free-market and, to an extent, liberal
democratic principles) from the “top down.” Recognizing the precarious state of a onedimensional economy totally dependent on oil revenue, Saudi’s young crown prince, Muhamad
bin Salman (MBS), introduced a grand vision for diversifying the Saudi economy, establishing
more free-market principles, and introducing modest liberal democratic values in society to make
Saudi Arabia more attractive to investors, tourists, and the world at-large.16 His plan, dubbed
Vision 2030, represents an ambitious- and prescient- effort to bring western-style change to the
Kingdom. However, the plan has encountered staunch resistance from –surprisingly- the Saudi
citizenry.17 Accustomed to lucrative government benefits and support, Saudi citizens appear
resistant to austerity measures related to Vision 2030 goals introduced by the government.18
Additionally, the near total reliance on foreign labor in critical sectors of their economy indicate
that Saudis seem unwilling or unable to establish and form the type of manufacturing and
construction industry sectors that the new and diversified economy (according to Vision 2030)
will require.19
“Top down” efforts driving Western-style reforms have also manifested themselves in the
social and foreign policy realms. MBS’ initiatives have recently introduced modest (but
significant) liberal-democratic values into Saudi society by allowing women to drive, severely
curbing the power of the mutawa- the Saudi religious police charged with enforcing Islamic
social standards of decency-, and making the wearing of the traditional conservative female
covering, the abaya, optional.20 In the foreign policy realm, MBS has drastically re-defined the
Saudi relationship with the Salafi-influenced Muslim Brotherhood, cutting ties with the
organization and even going so far to label the group a “terrorist” organization while punishing
Gulf neighbors for their support of the group.21 Saudi Arabia is perhaps trying to re-brand
moderate Islam as the state religion and garner more widespread support for their soft-power
approaches aimed at building and supporting Islamic institutions. These efforts demonstrate the
comprehensive scope of “top-down” reform efforts aimed at steering the country more towards
Western-values.
In Iran, the opposite reform dynamic holds sway as a frustrated Iranian citizenry
represents the change agents advocating for Western reform. Weary of financing a plethora of
foreign wars and angry at widespread government corruption that has impoverished the nation,
protests demanding (among other things) Western-style reform emanate from the “bottom-up” in
Iranian society. In January 2018, protests erupted in over 30 Iranian cities as the economy

16
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collapsed under the weight of government mismanagement and U.S. sanctions.22 Indeed, a
popular chant among the protesters of this time cried “Death to the Ayatollah.” However,
government agents and apparatus show little signs of reforming a system that enriches and
empowers them.
Both the religious and historical factors discussed above heavily impact the state and
disposition of reform efforts in Saudi Arabia and Iran. The “short-termism” (that is, a preference
to maintain the lucrative status quo despite the long-term dangers) that characterizes the Saudi
citizenry resistance to “top-down” reform reflects its nascent status as a political entity- still
wrestling with how to develop and implement critical political and government structures to best
support the citizenry in the long-term. As noted by scholar Dani Thompson, the nature of the
“social bargain” between modern Saudi rulers and their citizens trades government assurances of
prosperity (lucrative financial benefits) for unquestioned social and political patronage.23 Saudi
preference for lucrative government support is indirectly tied to the role religion played in the
formation of the Kingdom- which allowed it to have a prosperous and open relationship with the
West and has perhaps created a set of expectations for prosperity amongst the citizenry that is
proving difficult to sustain. Likewise, Iran’s resistance to “bottom-up” efforts reflects its history
and the role religion played in founding the modern (post-1979) state. Iran’s citizens have a
historical perspective of events that influences their expectations of the state. They can clearly
look back through history and see prosperous, fully developed Persian empires- such as the
Achaemenids (550 B.C.), the Safavids (1500)- at the forefront of civilization.24 These memories
likely fuel bottom-up cries for change and also reflect the fact that (unlike the nascent Saudi
state), Iran has all the ingredients for a diversified economy. However, the role of religion in
forming the modern state makes enmity with the West a foregone conclusion (and, indeed, a
stated policy objective from the current regime).25 Thus, the ruling regime’s resistance to
Western-style reforms is a natural and obstinate outgrowth of the system.

Thomas Erdbrink, “Protests Pop Up Across Iran Fueled by Daily Disatisfaction,” New York Times, 4
August 2018, accessed 18 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/middleeast/iranprotests.html.
23
Dani Thompson, “Saudi Arabia’s Creative Change of (He)art. Capstone Paper, The Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University. May, 2020. https://cpb-use1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/6/1613/files/2020/05/DaniThompsonCapstone2020SaudiChangeofHeart_3.pdf
24
Axworthy, History of Iran, chapters 1-2.
25
Parsa, Democracy in Iran, 100-103.
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FIGURE 1: Change Paradigms in Iran and Saudi Arabia

Part II: Guarding of the Change: A Power and Systems Perspective of Reform Initiatives
Having distilled both who the change agents and resistance elements are in each country
and why the reform paradigms are arrayed the way they are in each country, it is necessary to
analyze how the change dynamics in Iran and Saudi Arabia develop and persist in order to
recommend effective actions advocating for desired reforms while blunting unwanted resistance
to change. While theories and concepts abound regarding how change happens, one way to
approach the question is through a “power and systems” approach (PSA) as explained by author
Duncan Green. In his book How Change Happens, Green articulates how those desiring to bring
about reform must understand both the complex systems involved in the change process as well
as the actors who wield the power to adopt changes in the system.26 As an offshoot of the
systems approach to change, researchers from Harvard University suggest and demonstrate that
the prospects of introducing divergent change into a system is directly related to how open or
closed the system is.27 In closed systems with tightly organized networks, successfully
introducing and adopting divergent change is very difficult. Conversely, in open networks
(defined as having “structural holes” between the connections), introducing divergent change is
often more feasible. In addition to these relationships between systems and change, Duncan
Green also notes the role of power in the change process. Green identifies various dimensions of
power that bear on the change process, notably “visible power” (i.e. the overt and official
structures of government and political power), “hidden power” (i.e. the actions by actors behind
26

Duncan Green. 2016. How Change Happens. Oxford University Press.
Julie Battilana et al. “Change Agents, Networks, And Institutions: A Contingency Theory of
Organizational Change,” Harvard Business School Faculty Publications,
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the scenes of official power structures), and “invisible power” (i.e. the psychological forces at
work that cause societies to accept their condition). Taken together, the power and systems
principles for analyzing change may go a long way in explaining the state of reform initiatives in
Iran and Saudi Arabia.
As a monarchy ruled by a single family, the political system in Saudi Arabia is a tightly
closed system – deriving its inputs from a single source (the Royal family). As per the dynamics
described above, this makes the introduction of divergent change, like the Western-style change
described in Vision 2030, unlikely to succeed as securing needed support from critical societal
stakeholders for rapid and large-scale reforms becomes difficult. Indeed, upon assuming his
powerful new role as crown prince, MBS initiated a series of high profile arrests for corruptionincluding royal family members-which many saw as his attempt to consolidate power, or, in
terms of power and systems, his attempt to influence the closed political system to support his
Vision 2030 goals.28 Much of the criticism surrounding MBS’ Vision 2030 highlights that his
plan introduces ambitious and positive economic reforms without the necessary and
corresponding political reforms to make it work. In other words, according to a power and
systems approach to change, the closed Saudi system is too rigid to support such divergent
economic reform without reforms that also open the political system. On the power side of the
equation, the resistance from the Saudi citizenry reflects the “invisible power” developed over
time from a population that has grown to accept (and protect) its condition as the beneficiaries of
government sponsorship. Armed with this “invisible power,” the Saudi citizenry mobilizes its
“hidden power” to obstruct and/or delay some of the government austerity measures (visible
power) required for the implementation of Vision2030.
As noted earlier, in Iran, the reform initiatives advocating for Western values emanate
from the citizenry in a bottom-up fashion. However, the system that generates these initiatives is
extremely open- taking inputs from a number of sources. Unlike the “Green Movement” in 2009
that mobilized massive and sustained Iranian resistance to the government over the unified cause
of alleged election fraud, the distinguishing characteristic of the most recent wave of protests in
Iran in early 2018 was their inability to coalesce around a single issue.29 Protesters trotted out a
litany of slogans during the protests- from the traditional “Death to America” and “Death to
Israel” to the more unconventional “Death to Rouhani” and “Death to the Ayatollah.” In essence,
Iranians seemed to be saying “Death to everything” and thus no single issue emerged. In this
environment, the “hidden power” of a mobilized Iranian citizenry lacks the unification required
to influence the strong “visible power” structures of the Iranian regime.
It is difficult to have a changing of the guard while there is a “guarding of the change.”
That is, even as movements exist in both Iran and Saudi Arabia advocating for Western-style
reform, efforts in both Saudi Arabia and Iran remain frustrated as power structures in each
system jealously guard any attempts at reform. In Saudi Arabia, a closed system, in conjunction
with the “invisible” and “hidden” powers of the citizenry hinders top-down reform initiatives. In
Iran, bottom-up reform initiatives born in an (overly) open system lack the unifying force from
“hidden” and “invisible” power sources to seriously challenge the “visible power” of the Iranian
regime.

David Kirkpatrick. “Saudi Arabia Arrests 11 Princes, Including Billionaire Alwaleed bin Talal,” New
York Times, 4 November 2017.
29
Ray Takey. 2018, “Masses vs. Mullahs: Iran’s Rulers Losing their Last Group of Supporters,” National
Review, (February 2018)
28
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FIGURE 2: Power and Systems Iceberg Analysis of Change in Iran and Saudi Arabia

Part III: The Difference Between Reform and “Re-Form”
The above analysis and assessment of Western-style reform initiatives currently playing
out within the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry throws into sharp relief the divergent dynamics of
reform in each country. Understanding the differences makes it possible to evaluate the prospects
of reform initiatives in each country and make recommendations that both support change agents
and help overcome tension and obstructions from resistance elements in each country. In Saudi
Arabia, reform initiatives require a more open political system – with more diversity among the
inputs- that will more readily embrace the divergent reforms offered by Vision2030. Perhaps
more difficult are the cultural and societal attitudes and expectations that must shift in Saudi
Arabia to overcome the “invisible power” perceptions of the citizenry. The amazingly wealthy yet dangerously one-dimensional economy resulting from oil wealth creates internal
psychological resistance towards establishing an economy based on Western values that rely on
diverse market competition from the private sector because it challenges (and threatens) the
decades-old basis of the “social bargain” between Saudis and their rulers—forcing adjustments
in expectations.30 While the ruling elite in Saudi Arabia recognize the long-term unsustainability
and in-feasibility of the current system (and have introduced Western-style reforms on this
basis), they are learning a fact that the U.S. knows all too well from its foreign policy experience
abroad: winning the “hearts and minds” of a society can be extremely difficult.31
In Iran (and unlike in Saudi Arabia), the groundwork for a diverse and complex economy
already exists while a willing and able population clamors for the opportunity to return Iran to
Dani Thompson, Saudi Arabia’s Creative New (He)art, 8.
Dafna Linzer, “Lost in Translation: Alhurra: America’s Troubled Effort to Win Middle East Hearts and
Minds,” ProPublica, 22 June, 2008. https://www.propublica.org/article/alhurra-middle-east-hearts-and-minds-622.
30
31
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the prominence it has enjoyed for long periods of its history. The problem lies in the corrupt
“visible power” structures of the regime that control the wealth at the expense of the population.
Perhaps no organization symbolizes the corruption of the Iranian regime better than the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Having evolved from its early role as a military protector of
the revolution after 1979, today the IRGC controls large swaths of the Iranian economy and its
appetite for wealth, power, and control comes at the expense of the Iranian people.32 Reform in
Iran requires the “invisible” and “hidden” power sources within the Iranian citizenry to unite
(like in 2009) and compel the necessary concessions and reforms from the regime.
On balance, the prospects for Western-style reform in both Iran and Saudi Arabia can be
stated in terms of the difference between “reform” and “re-form.” In Iran, political reform of the
mechanisms which distribute power and wealth will help re-vitalize an economy and society that
is already built and awaiting the opportunity. In Saudi Arabia, “re-forming” the economy and
society to be both less dependent on oil (economy) and less accustomed to its artificial wealth
(society) will help re-align the power and systems dynamics to support Western-style reforms.
Despite the current geopolitical dynamics in which the United States enjoys a much closer and
productive relationship with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia seems to have a harder path forward in
terms of introducing and adopting Western reforms. While the difference between “reform” and
“re-form” seems subtle (and possibly just semantics), one (reform) involves adjusting political
mechanisms. This is (largely) what is required in Iran. The other (re-form) requires the arguably
much more difficult and lengthy task of re-building not just an authentic economy, but also the
psychological and cultural expectations of a society. This is the scope of the work for Saudi
Arabia.
When considering how best to influence desired reform efforts in Saudi Arabia and Iran,
a useful framework for characterizing national actions categorizes the elements of national power
(the tools available to statesmen and policy makers) according to diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic domains. Collectively, these elements of national power are known as
DIME and provide a common language to articulate recommendations. In supporting Westernstyle reforms in the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, the U.S. should seek to conduct DIME actions that
support the change agents in each country while decreasing the concerns of the resistors. In
Saudi Arabia, the “visible power” government leaders represent the change agents seeking to
introduce and adopt Western-style reform in the country. U.S. actions, therefore, should seek to
develop cooperation (when possible) with this entity to help nurture and advise the reform
initiatives associated (mainly) with Vision2030. One action in the diplomatic (D) domain that the
U.S. can (and should) take immediately is to end the politically motivated attacks and
accusations emanating from American political circles that characterize the Saudi government as
a state sponsor of terror and/or as bearing responsibility for the September 11th attacks in the
U.S.33 In 2016, congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) which
New York Democrat Chuck Schumer sponsored and which aimed to link official Saudi

Ramin Jahanbegloo, “Revolution Is Not Here,” The Indian Express, 3 January 2018, accessed 6
September 2018,
http://dspace.jgu.edu.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10739/1507/1/Revolution%20is%20not%20here%20_%20The%20Indi
an%20Express.pdf.
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compliance in the 9/11 attacks to justice for the U.S. victims.34 However, after its passing and
perhaps realizing the frivolity of the action (which incurred a presidential veto), many of the
act’s supporters immediately called for revisions to the act – acknowledging, among other things,
the risks created for Americans serving in Saudi Arabia and the geopolitical consequences of
undermining a strong regional ally.35 These actions reveal the nakedly political objectives of the
act while exposing the folly in seeking justice in the wrong places. Besides being widely disproven in the official U.S. investigation of 9/11, allegations of official Saudi involvement in 9/11
belie the fact that the Saudi government fought its own bloody battle against Sunni-extremism in
the mid-2000s.36 Calling Saudi Arabia Bin Laden’s “third front” in his global terror campaign,
Bruce Riedel highlights how Al Qaeda infiltrated the Kingdom and viciously fought to
overthrow the “apostate” royal family in the mid-2000s.37 During this time, U.S. and Saudi
Counter-Terrorism experts worked closely to bring about the military defeat of Al-Qaeda in the
Kingdom.38 It is also worth remembering that before Bin Laden and Al Qaeda hated America,
they hated Saudi Arabia. The Saudis expelled Bin Laden from the Kingdom in 1991 and Bin
Laden himself reserved some of his most vitriolic comments for the Kingdom – not the United
States.39
Clearly, radical Islamic terrorism is a shared threat between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. The extremist ideology that motivated the 9/11 attacks exists everywhere – including, as
recruitment for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) demonstrates, in the West.40
Laying this issue at the feet of the Saudi Arabia in the name of justice exposes American
political intrigue to exactly the same extent that it compromises American ideals – the very
ideals that the Saudi government has shown a willingness to import. It is irresponsible and shortsighted to manipulate the sanctity of American values for expedient political ends and those who
supported the JASTA (against the judgement of the White House), seem to have acknowledged
this reality. Plainly, linking official Saudi involvement to the terror attack of 9/11 is as frivolous
and preposterous as claiming that the U.S. was complicit in the Oklahoma City bombing because
Timothy McVeigh was once a government employee. The (unfortunately) oft-repeated narrative
of official Saudi involvement in terror plots against the U.S. only alienates the very agents of
Western-style change in Saudi Arabia that should be courted and supported. In addition to
alienating the change agents in Saudi Arabia, falsely asserting Saudi links to terrorism for
political gain undermines and discredits legitimate U.S. messages attempting to hold Saudi
Arabia accountable to Western values in other areas. Bluntly, by trumpeting a false narrative of
official Saudi support for terrorism, U.S. condemnations of Saudi Arabia involvement in
potential human rights violations (i.e. Jamal Khashogi) sound hollow and disingenuous.
34
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In the informational (I) domain, the U.S. can decrease resistance to Western-style
reforms in Saudi Arabia by expanding programs that allow Saudi citizens to study and
collaborate in the U.S. Widening existing exchange programs to let Saudis observe and live
Western values attacks the “invisible power” resistance currently playing out amongst Saudi
citizens. This action advertises, in a supremely practical way, the American way of life. As an
informational (I) tool, it gives Saudis (and all foreigners) better information and tangible
evidence regarding the benefits of implementing American values. At a time when Middle East
migration and travel to the U.S. is a hot button issue and often a black-eye for the U.S. in the
Muslim world, encouraging exchanges for qualified Saudis could go a long way (over time) in
reducing psychological attitudes resistant (or even ambivalent) to Western values.41 The
dynamics of change outlined above and throughout this article indicate that Western-style
reforms will be hard enough to achieve in their own right within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. should
not make it harder by amplifying false messages that discourage Saudi Arabia change agents
while doing little to entice and attract those within Saudi Arabia towards Western values.
In Iran, change agents advocating for Western values originate largely from the “bottomup” within the Iranian citizenry. Therefore, U.S. efforts to support reform should work to support
the movements generated by ordinary Iranians. One action in the economic (E) domain that the
U.S. should consider taking is ending the robust (and often unilateral) economic sanctions
imposed on Iran. As the centerpiece of U.S. efforts to exert “maximum pressure” on the Iranian
regime, the sanctions are designed to curb Iranian support to terrorism in the region and coerce
Iran to the negotiating table regarding its nuclear weapons program.42 However, to date, the
sanctions are not achieving these ends. Iran has at least sustained (and perhaps increased) its
support to regional terror proxies even in spite U.S. sanctions. Iranian-supported Shia militia
groups (SMGs) in Iraq routinely target American and allied bases with rocket attacks.43
Additionally, recent allied maritime operations have interdicted large Iranian shipments of
weapons intended to support the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen.44 Furthermore, Iran’s
leaders have flatly rejected American overtures and offers for unqualified negotiations.45 Perhaps
even more significant than the sanctions failure to achieve their stated purpose is the fact that
they these sanctions work to frustrate reform efforts in the country in several important ways.
First, the economic hardship resulting from the sanctions falls on the Iranian people – the change
agents. The value of the Iranian currency has plummeted to all-time lows because of the
sanctions which has in turn created massive inflation and economic devastation in Iran.46 During
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the 2018 widespread protests across Iran demanding (among other things) better economic
conditions, “Death to America” remained a popular refrain from the Iranian crowds indicating a
perception of American blame for the economic conditions47 In illustrating the reform-stifling
effects of sanctions, a comparison to military targeting methods is useful. In the military, the
“law of proportionality” dictates that lethal responses to aggression be proportional to the offense
given. That is, it is unlawful to destroy a hospital full of civilians simply because a single
terrorist enters the facility. Sanctions are the economic equivalent of this violation: in desiring to
economically target the ruling regime (the single terrorist), U.S. sanctions level the entire Iranian
economy (the hospital full of civilians). The devastating effects of this methodology are
particularly acute in Iran because the vast collateral damage incurred through sanctions
represents the very demographic (Iranian citizenry) that should be supported in their reform
efforts.
More targeted options for economic actions exist that could be considered such as
increasing the scope and support of U.S. and allied efforts tracking and penalizing Iranian
financial support to terrorism through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) initiated
after 9/11.48 According to the U.S. Department of State 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, the
Countering Transnational Terrorism Fund (CTTF), also established specifically to target funds
earmarked for global terrorism, has produced tangible results building international coalitions
dedicated to interdicting the money supply that supporters of terrorism, such as Iran, rely on to
conduct de-stabilizing operations. Not only do such actions leverage the global community of
interest in stopping terrorism, but they represent efforts committed to targeting strictly terrorist
funds - not the national economy of a nation-state.
Besides engendering anger and hostility from the very population that U.S. actions should
endeavor to support, the sanctions also enable the Iranian Regime to mask their corrupt practices
by giving it a convenient and attractive (not to mention accurate) scapegoat for the Iranian
economic malaise: the West – an in particular the U.S. Secondly, the sanctions marginalize and
discredit moderate reformist leaders who represent the best chance for incremental and positive
Western-style reform in the country’s “visible power” structures. Iran’s current president, Hassan
Rouhani, is a moderate who won his election largely on promises of economic recovery tied to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, the recovery has failed to
materialize- largely because of heavy U.S. sanctions- and Rouhani has in turn become the focal
point for Iranian criticism.49 Additionally, hard-liners all but swept the most recent parliamentary
elections in Iran.50 These results are either an indicator of increased Iranian popular support to
the hard-liner agenda or of the persistent power of the hard-line regime to maintain political
control in spite of “maximum pressure” economic actions. In essence, hard-liners within the
Iranian regime can point to moderate reformist leaders and say to Iranians: “See, reformist
Parisa Hafezi. 2018. Iranian Marchers Chant “Death to America on Eve of U.S. Oil Sanctions.” Reuters,
November 4th 2018, accessed 09 June 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/iranian-marchers-chantdeath-to-america-on-eve-of-u-s-oil-sanctions-idUSKCN1N908J.
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policies don’t work and you’re better off under our hardline policies.” Thus, sanctions actually
seem to swing the country more towards hardline, anti-Western leaders and policy.
U.S. sanctions also seem to have pushed Iran into the orbit of great power adversaries of
the United States as Iran seeks nation-state partners to circumvent the sanctions. Iran recently
confirmed its “strategic” negotiations with China as part of a long-term partnership with
Beijing.51 A “Sino-Persian” alliance- featuring a partnership between America’s most potent
great power rival (China) and its most dangerous nation-state threat (Iran)- would greatly
destabilize the Middle East and displace American influence.
It is true that lifting sanctions would give the Iranian regime access to vastly more
financial resources and perhaps invigorate its hostile military and foreign policy objectives. But
without Western free-market principles under-girding their economy, it is unlikely that Iranians
will see the trickle-down benefits of the increased capital. Thus, reform initiatives emanating
from the citizenry will likely persist even without American sanctions because their core
grievance against the regime will remain. As noted by scholar Afshin Shahi, since the early
1990s, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been consolidating economic power
and control in Iran which ensures the formation of gross wealth inequalities between the ruling
elite and the average Iranian citizen.52 Indeed, analyst Ramin Jahanbegloo also highlights how
the IRGC likely controls all major industries in Iran.53 This type of oligarchic control breeds
corruption and is the antithesis of Western free-market principles. Lifting sanctions will (finally)
expose and lay bare Iranian corruption (without Western scapegoats) for all to see which, in turn,
could invigorate and unify Iranian change agents’ initiatives aimed at steering the country
towards Western values.
In the Information (I) domain, increasing broadcasts of Persian language messages of
support to the protesters that emphasize American liberal democratic values is one way to help
build and spread support for Western style reform efforts originating at the grassroots level in
Iranian society. In March 2019, Voice of America announced the establishment of a 24/7 Persian
language broadcast to help disseminate positive American messages and combat the spread of
disinformation from the state-controlled Iranian media in Iran.54 Demonstrating the power of this
information tool, President Trump’s Persian-language tweets of support for Iranian protesters in
early 2019 became the most-liked Persian language tweet in history.55 Conditions appear ripe in
this domain to assist Iranian reform efforts.
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In the military (M) domain, U.S. actions seem to be creating desired effects given Saudi
Arabia and Iran’s status as geopolitical ally (Saudi Arabia) or adversary (Iran). In Saudi Arabia,
military sales from the United States will likely exceed over 110 billion dollars over the next
several years - helping the Saudis modernize their force and, in the process, stimulating both
economies.56 In Iran, even as sanctions have failed to change Iranian behavior, strong U.S.
military actions aimed at deterring Iranian aggression appear to have altered (in the near term)
the Iranian risk calculus for leveraging their military apparatus against U.S. forces. After the U.S.
strike that killed Iranian General Qasem Soulemanei, Iran appeared reluctant to retaliate in a
proportional and meaningful way against the United States.57 These efforts in the military
domain demonstrate that it is possible to reward allies (Saudi Arabia) and hold adversaries
accountable through demonstrations of American military resolve and strength. Critically,
neither of the actions taken in the military domain preclude or nullify the recommended suite of
DIME actions aimed at encouraging reform efforts in both countries.
As a concluding thought, it is worth highlighting that none of the actions recommended
above represent a “silver bullet” that can quickly and decisively usher in desired reforms
overnight. Even taken collectively as coordinated actions across the DIME spectrum, change
itself is a process and long-term proposal. Realist skeptics will no doubt characterize the above
value-based actions as naive- or downright foolish- in an international community composed of
states with defined and entrenched interests to defend. But if the DIME recommendations
proposed here seem unrealistic, it seems more unrealistic to assume that Iran, a state adversary
with (competing) interests of its own vis a vis the United States, will be coerced into changing its
behavior. Realist skeptics should ask themselves what about the current interest-based policies
regarding Iran are bringing success. Little about recent coercive actions undertaken as policy
measures suggest progress towards forcing Iran to change its behavior. Military deterrence has
shown the most promise in checking Iranian aggression and the suite of DIME actions
recommended above can be implemented without abandoning this critical military role The
recommended suite of DIME actions also advance a coherent theme advocating the premise that
it is better to entice adversaries to American values rather than coerce them. In this sense, the
recommendations reflect idealist principles. By treating stability and peace as desired ends and
critical interests, and military deterrence as an effective means for achieving those ends, the
recommendations also reflect realist principles. According to popular legend, Einstein defined
insanity as expecting a different result through repeated identical attempts and the long-standing
policy actions that have failed to change Iranian behavior should be viewed in this light. Policy
actions that break Iran (i.e. its economy and citizenry) in order to coerce behavior change
represent, at best, Pyrrhic victories that do little to accomplish true and enduring change and the
long-term required progress.
Conclusion
Even as Iran and Saudi Arabia engage in a rivalry that puts them at odds with each other
and, concurrently, on opposing ends of the relational spectrum with the United States, all three
countries share a unique point in history that once engendered cooperation and suggested an
56
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immense potential for friendship. As the global order shifted after WWII and ushered in the
United States as the world’s preeminent power, both Saudi Arabia and Iran courted American
friendship as a welcome alternative to the exploitation that seemed to characterize the Middle
East under the imperial world order. After WWII, Mohammed Reza Shah, Iran’s leader, made
passionate appeals for American support to Iranian nationalism – drawing similarities between
Iran’s nationalistic agenda to the American Revolution.58 A period of intense cooperation
through the appointment of American business, military, and government advisors in Iran
followed.59 Similarly, King Abdul-Aziz met President Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake aboard
the USS Quincy in 1945, beginning the so-called “special relationship” between the Kingdom
and the United States.60 At this inflection point, American ideals resonated loudly on the world
stage-particularly in Middle Eastern countries that had just unshackled themselves from colonial
practices. Yet, as America accumulated global interests, disillusionment with Western ideals, in
one way or another, took hold in both countries. In Iran, American involvement in the coup
d’état that ousted President Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 contributed to anti-American
sentiment that culminated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In Saudi Arabia, the perception of
unfettered American support to Israel at the expense of Arab Palestinians drove a wedge in the
relationship that manifested itself through the 1973 oil embargo that “weaponized” oil and
greatly impacted global energy markets.
Since the disillusionment, the re-introduction of the potential of Western values has
proven difficult in Saudi Arabia and Iran. History and the role of religion has created inverted
paradigms for Western-aligned reform initiatives in each country. In Saudi Arabia, top-down
change agents from the government encounter resistance from bottom-up expectations of the
citizenry. In Iran, bottom-up change agents fail to overcome the top-down political power
structures of the regime. In Saudi Arabia, a politically closed system clashes with “invisible
power” from the citizenry to frustrate reform. In Iran, an open system generating reform
initiatives fails to coalesce into a unifying force to challenge the “visible power” structures of the
regime. These dynamics leave each country on un-equal footing with respect to the prospects of
adopting Western-style reforms. While Iran, possessing all the ingredients of a complex and
developed economic and social system, requires reform, Saudi Arabia, with a one-dimensional
economy and unsustainable expectations from its citizenry, requires a re-forming of its economy
and national expectations.
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FIGURE 3: A Healthy Change Mode

Healthy reform should not be a zero-sum proposition that prescribes winners and losers.
Rather, it should be a shared burden and commitment towards progress. The potential for
Western values to infuse the Middle East seemed to ring loudest when American ideals balanced
its global interests as the U.S. entered the world stage after WWII. Therefore, the best way to
support reform initiatives in Iran and Saudi Arabia demands that the United States also change
and stand on its values while assuming some risk in its interests. For Saudi Arabia, the United
States should model noble political behavior and refrain from frivolous, unwarranted, and
politically motivated attacks that compromise its image and reputation – not to mention the
credibility of Western values. In Iran, the United States should let its economic values stand
alone to attract and entice others- renouncing economic sanctions that only serve to undermine
reform initiatives and discredit moderate Iranian leaders. These actions require the United States
to assume some risk in its short-term security interests. However, the long-term benefits of a
peacefully resolved Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and a stable Middle East far outweigh the risks.
These actions also reflect biblical mandates to encourage peaceful living amongst neighbors and
friends– whether in the local or international neighborhood- and help fulfill the hopes and
aspirations of friendship between the West and the Middle East deferred since America’s ascent
to world prominence after WWII.
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